vulnerability / NVI-00015392 / Revision 2
praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonaiagents. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
7.1 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonaiagents
source listed< 1.6.58
### Summary `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__()` constructs all memory file paths by directly joining the `user_id` parameter to a base path: ```python self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization ``` No validation or normalization is applied to `user_id` before the path join. An attacker who can supply a `user_id` containing `../` sequences can write arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to **any writable location on the filesystem**. The vulnerability is confirmed **live on the current `main` branch** (`praisonaiagents==1.6.52`) and is **distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744** (which covered `MultiAgentMonitor` in an example file, not `FileMemory` in the core library). ### Details **Vulnerable code — `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:** ```python def __init__( self, user_id: str = "default", base_path: Optional[str] = None, ... ): ... self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic" self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path self.episodic_path.mk
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-55527 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.