vulnerability / NVI-00015395 / Revision 1
Scrapy: S3DownloadHandler sends signed S3 requests over plaintext HTTP by default
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for scrapy. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
scrapy
source listed< 2.17.0
### Problem Scrapy’s `S3DownloadHandler` sends signed S3 requests over plaintext HTTP by default. A normal request like `s3://bucket/key` is converted into `http://bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/key` unless `request.meta["is_secure"]` is explicitly set. The generated request is then signed with configured AWS credentials, so AWS authorization material can be sent without TLS. Vulnerable code in `scrapy/core/downloader/handlers/s3.py`: ```python scheme = "https" if request.meta.get("is_secure") else "http" url = f"{scheme}://{bucket}.s3.amazonaws.com{path}" ``` The request is then signed and dispatched: ```python self._signer.add_auth(awsrequest) request = request.replace(url=url, headers=awsrequest.headers.items()) ``` ### Impact Users making Scrapy `s3://` requests with AWS credentials are impacted. A network attacker able to observe traffic between Scrapy and S3, such as a public Wi-Fi attacker, compromised router, ISP/corporate network observer, or local network attacker using ARP spoofing, can read: ```text bucket/key path AWS Authorization header X-Amz-Security-Token, if temporary credentials are used S3 object contents S3 response headers ``` An active MITM attacker can a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-76g3-c3x4-crvx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.