vulnerability / NVI-00016012 / Revision 1
Gogs: Overwriting critical files results in a denial of service
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for gogs.io/gogs. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
gogs.io/gogs
source listed<= 0.13.4
**Vulnerability type:** Path Traversal **Impact:** DoS **Exploitation prerequisite:** authorized user **Description:** As an authorized user, an intruder can dictate the value which is passed to the `git diff` command which, together with bypassing the filtering of the passed value, allows the user to bypass the target directory and write the result of the comparison to any arbitrary path. **Researcher:** Artyom Kulakov (Positive Technologies) **Mitigation:** 1. https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/b7372b1f32cd0bb40984debfb049e3fc04efaee4/internal/route/repo/editor.go#L307 — on this line, instead of the `treePath` variable, which comes directly from the user unchanged, we should first filter and then pass the `entry` variable. 2. To filter the `treePath` variable, it is better to use the preexisting `pathutil.Clean` function instead of `path.Clean` from the standard Go library. ### Exploitation A Positive Technologies researcher discovered that the user has the ability to preview their changes when editing a file in the repository. The `POST /:user/:repo/_preview/:branch/:path_to_file` method is responsible for displaying the changes. The problem is how the `POST /:user/:repo/_previe
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pm6v-2h4w-4rp2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.