vulnerability / NVI-00016018 / Revision 1
File Browser: Improper Access Control Occurs via Pre-Created Public Share for a Non-existent Path
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
source listed<= 2.63.6
### Summary This is similar vulnrability of **`CVE-2026-0035`**, which was fixed in Android `MediaProvider` with **high** severity. In the original Java issue, `MediaStore.createWriteRequest()` accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request. `filebrowser/filebrowser` has the analogous issue in Go. `POST /api/share/` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/`. ### Details The vulnerable create path is: - `http/share.go` - `sharePostHandler()` - route: `POST /api/share/` `sharePostHandler()` only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a `share.Link` directly from `r.URL.Path` and saves it: ```go s = &share.Link{ Path: r.URL.Path, Hash: str, Expire: expire, UserID: d.
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
source listed<= 1.11.0
### Summary This is similar vulnrability of **`CVE-2026-0035`**, which was fixed in Android `MediaProvider` with **high** severity. In the original Java issue, `MediaStore.createWriteRequest()` accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request. `filebrowser/filebrowser` has the analogous issue in Go. `POST /api/share/` accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through `GET /api/public/dl/`. ### Details The vulnerable create path is: - `http/share.go` - `sharePostHandler()` - route: `POST /api/share/` `sharePostHandler()` only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a `share.Link` directly from `r.URL.Path` and saves it: ```go s = &share.Link{ Path: r.URL.Path, Hash: str, Expire: expire, UserID: d.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-3q2p-72cj-682c ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.