vulnerability / NVI-00016037 / Revision 1
TensorZero Gateway: Arbitrary file read and SSRF in internal object storage endpoint
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for tensorzero. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.7 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
tensorzero
source listed< 2026.6.0
### Impact The `/internal/object_storage` endpoint accepts a caller-supplied JSON `storage_path` parameter that dynamically overrides the TensorZero `[object_storage]` configuration. By abusing the `filesystem` storage type, a caller can read arbitrary files from the gateway filesystem, including files that may contain sensitive credentials. Similarly, by abusing the `s3_compatible` storage type, the caller can coerce the gateway into making outbound object storage requests to attacker-chosen internal/cloud-metadata endpoints. This vulnerability only applies when the gateway can be accessed by untrusted callers. If a developer's TensorZero deployment has authentication enabled, only authenticated callers can exploit this vulnerability. If a developer's deployment has authentication disabled, any caller can exploit this vulnerability. ### Remediation The vulnerability has been patched in version `2026.6.0`. See PR #7527. ### Workarounds If developers are unable to upgrade a gateway that is exposed to untrusted callers, please block external access to the `/internal/object_storage` endpoint.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-824w-x939-6cmc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.