vulnerability / NVI-00016047 / Revision 1
PraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp & Linear bots)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.6 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonai
source listed<= 4.6.52
The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only when a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset — the default on a fresh install and common in development — verification is skipped entirely and the webhook body is parsed and dispatched as a genuine, trusted event. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the bot's webhook endpoint can inject arbitrary platform events. Affected code: WhatsApp - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/whatsapp.py - __init__ (line 108): self._app_secret = app_secret or os.environ.get("WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET", "") -> defaults to "" - route (line 246): app.router.add_post(self._webhook_path, self._handle_webhook) -> default path "/webhook" - _handle_webhook (lines 585-595): `if self._app_secret:` gates the ENTIRE check; when falsy the body is json.loads()'d and dispatched to _process_webhook_data() with no verification. Linear - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py - __init__ (line 86): self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "") -> "" - _handle_webhook (lines 244-248): same `if self._signing_secret:` fail-open guard. - start() (lines 169-170): on
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-x92v-rpx6-p6cw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.