vulnerability / NVI-00016052 / Revision 1
PraisonAI: HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
praisonai
source listed>= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58
# HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools ## Summary `praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval` renders pending tool approval arguments directly into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can inject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect the risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to the same request's `/approve/{request_id}/decide` endpoint, causing `HTTPApproval` to return `approved=True`. The local PoV uses a harmless `touch /tmp/prai010 #` command prefix and stops at the approval decision. It does not execute the command. ## Affected Versions Proposed affected range: `>= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.57`. Validated affected: - current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` (`v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`) - `v4.5.2` - `v4.5.3` - `v4.5.124` - `v4.5.126` - `v4.5.128` - `v4.6.10` - `v4.6.56` - `v4.6.57` `v4.5.0` and `v4.5.1` do not contain the HTTPApproval backend. ## Impact An attacker who can influence an agent task or prompt enough to produce a dangerous tool call can embed a short XSS payload in the tool argument. When the huma
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-63v4-w882-g4x2 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.