By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00016053 / Revision 1

vLLM: Speech-to-text upload size limit is enforced after full UploadFile read

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vllm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-v82g-2437-67m2CVE-2026-55646

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

6.5 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

vllm

source listed
  • >= 0.22.0, < 0.24.0

## Summary Current-head vLLM documents `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB` as the maximum audio file size accepted by the speech-to-text APIs. The default is 25 MB. `vllm/envs.py` also describes files larger than this value as rejected. The `/v1/audio/transcriptions` and `/v1/audio/translations` routes call `await request.file.read()` before vLLM checks that limit. In FastAPI and Starlette, `UploadFile.read()` returns bytes from the uploaded file object; when called without a size argument, the route materializes the remaining file contents. vLLM then performs the compressed file-size check later in `_preprocess_speech_to_text()` against the already-created `bytes` object. As a result, the documented compressed audio file-size limit does not bound the memory allocated by vLLM endpoint code before validation. An oversized multipart upload can cause vLLM to allocate memory proportional to the uploaded file size before rejecting the request as too large. This is distinct from `GHSA-6pr9-rp53-2pmc`, which covered decoded PCM expansion after compressed input was accepted. This report covers compressed upload materialization before compressed-size validation. ## Technical Details The

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-v82g-2437-67m2 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗