vulnerability / NVI-00016071 / Revision 1
protobufjs: Denial of service through unbounded Any expansion during JSON conversion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for protobufjs, protobufjs. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
protobufjs
source listed<= 7.6.0
## Summary protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated `toObject()` conversion and the custom `google.protobuf.Any` JSON conversion path. A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested `Any` values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON. ## Impact An attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause message conversion to fail with a stack overflow. This affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf input containing `google.protobuf.Any` values and then convert decoded messages to JSON or plain objects with JSON conversion enabled, for example through `JSON.stringify(message)`, `Message#toJSON()`, or `Type.toObject(message, { json: true })`. Applications that only decode and re-encode protobuf binary data without converting decoded messages to JSON are not directly affected by this issue. ## Preconditions * The application must decode protobuf binary data influenced by an attacker. * The application schema must include `google.protobuf.Any`, and the reference
protobufjs
source listed>= 8.0.0, <= 8.4.0
## Summary protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated `toObject()` conversion and the custom `google.protobuf.Any` JSON conversion path. A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested `Any` values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON. ## Impact An attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause message conversion to fail with a stack overflow. This affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf input containing `google.protobuf.Any` values and then convert decoded messages to JSON or plain objects with JSON conversion enabled, for example through `JSON.stringify(message)`, `Message#toJSON()`, or `Type.toObject(message, { json: true })`. Applications that only decode and re-encode protobuf binary data without converting decoded messages to JSON are not directly affected by this issue. ## Preconditions * The application must decode protobuf binary data influenced by an attacker. * The application schema must include `google.protobuf.Any`, and the reference
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wcpc-wj8m-hjx6 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.