vulnerability / NVI-00016100 / Revision 1
hono: CORS Middleware reflects any Origin with credentials when `origin` defaults to the wildcard
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for hono. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
hono
source listed< 4.12.25
### Summary With `credentials: true` and no explicit `origin` (the default wildcard), the CORS Middleware reflects the request's `Origin` and sends `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. Any site can then make credentialed cross-origin requests and read the responses, exposing cookie-authenticated endpoints to arbitrary origins. ### Details The spec forbids `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` with credentials and browsers reject it, so this configuration used to fail closed. In affected versions the middleware reflects the request `Origin` instead, so it now succeeds for every origin, including `null`. The preflight also echoes the requested headers back, approving non-simple credentialed requests too. This issue arises when an application enables `credentials: true` and leaves `origin` unset or set to the wildcard. ### Impact Any third-party page a logged-in user visits can read the application's cookie-authenticated endpoints and perform credentialed state-changing requests. This affects applications that enable credentialed CORS without restricting `origin`.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-88fw-hqm2-52qc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.