vulnerability / NVI-00016114 / Revision 1
Gitea: API Fork Endpoint Authorization Bypass Allows Organization Members to Bypass Repository Creation Restrictions
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
code.gitea.io/gitea
source listed< 1.26.0
### Summary The API endpoint used to fork repositories into organizations performs a weaker authorization check than the corresponding web UI and other repository creation endpoints. When a repository is forked into an organization through the API, the endpoint only verifies that the user is an organization member (`IsOrgMember()`), but does not verify whether the user is allowed to create repositories in that organization (`CanCreateOrgRepo()`). As a result, organization members belonging to teams with `can_create_org_repo=false` can still create repositories inside the organization by using the fork API. ### Details Affected endpoint: ``` POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks ``` In `routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go`, the endpoint performs the following authorization check: ```go if !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin { isMember, err := org.IsOrgMember(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID) if !isMember { ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, ...) return } } ``` The equivalent web UI implementation uses the stronger permission check: ```go isAllowedToFork, err := organization.OrgFromUser(ctxUser). CanCreateOrgRepo(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID) ``` The same `CanCreateOrgRepo()` authorization ch
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-rjvx-x5h2-6px5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.