vulnerability / NVI-00016137 / Revision 1
yt-dlp: Dangerous file type creation via insufficient filename sanitization (Bypass of CVE-2024-38519)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for yt-dlp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.3 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
yt-dlp
source listed< 2026.06.09
### Summary A vulnerability exists in yt-dlp that allows a remote attacker to write arbitrary OS-shortcut files (such as `.desktop`, `.url`, `.webloc`) to the user's filesystem, bypassing the remediation for `CVE-2024-38519`. ### Details The fix for `CVE-2024-38519` enforced an allowlist for file extensions, in order to prevent writing files with unsafe extensions (such as `.exe` or `.sh`) during file downloads. However, this allowlist explicitly included the unsafe extensions `.desktop`, `.url`, and `.webloc` so that the functionality of the `--write-link` option (and its variants) could be preserved. These allowlist inclusions can be exploited by an attacker to write malicious OS-shortcut files in the context of a media or subtitles download. Numerous yt-dlp extractors derive the downloaded media or subtitles file extension from a potentially attacker-controlled source. An attacker could craft an m3u8 file that contains an `EXT-X-MEDIA:TYPE=SUBTITLES` tag with a malicious URI (e.g., `URI="http://attacker/x.desktop"`), which would result in yt-dlp writing the attacker-controlled content to a file with a `.desktop` extension if the user had passed the `--write-subs` option. Wri
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-c6mh-fpjc-4pr3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.