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vulnerability / NVI-00016145 / Revision 2

GeoServer has an arbitrary file write vulnerability in its Master Password Dump Page

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app, org.geoserver.web:gs-web-sec-core, org.geoserver.web:gs-web-sec-core, org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-7qmg-grcp-qf25CVE-2025-52465

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.2 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app

source listed
  • >= 2.27.0, <= 2.27.2

### Summary A vulnerability exists that allows an authenticated administrator with access to GeoServer's security system to pass arbitrary file names to the Master Password Dump web page and create files containing the master password in plaintext. The provided file name must be an absolute path to the target file, the target file can not already exist and all parent directories must already exist. ### Details When dumping the master password, GeoServer will use the provided file name with minimal validation as long as it is a java.io.File path. The only limitation is that the fix for a previous, unrelated vulnerability prevents relative path traversal here but absolute paths can be used to access arbitrary files. GeoServer does not enforce a maximum password length by default which allows an administrator to place malicious code into their password which could then be dumped into a JSP file. ### Impact #### Remote Code Execution (High severity) This vulnerability can lead to executing arbitrary code if GeoServer is deployed in an environment where an attacker can dynamically deploy and execute a JSP file. This is possible if the geoserver.war file is simply placed into the webap

GitHub Advisory Database

org.geoserver.web:gs-web-sec-core

source listed
  • >= 2.27.0, <= 2.27.2

### Summary A vulnerability exists that allows an authenticated administrator with access to GeoServer's security system to pass arbitrary file names to the Master Password Dump web page and create files containing the master password in plaintext. The provided file name must be an absolute path to the target file, the target file can not already exist and all parent directories must already exist. ### Details When dumping the master password, GeoServer will use the provided file name with minimal validation as long as it is a java.io.File path. The only limitation is that the fix for a previous, unrelated vulnerability prevents relative path traversal here but absolute paths can be used to access arbitrary files. GeoServer does not enforce a maximum password length by default which allows an administrator to place malicious code into their password which could then be dumped into a JSP file. ### Impact #### Remote Code Execution (High severity) This vulnerability can lead to executing arbitrary code if GeoServer is deployed in an environment where an attacker can dynamically deploy and execute a JSP file. This is possible if the geoserver.war file is simply placed into the webap

GitHub Advisory Database

org.geoserver.web:gs-web-sec-core

source listed
  • <= 2.26.3

### Summary A vulnerability exists that allows an authenticated administrator with access to GeoServer's security system to pass arbitrary file names to the Master Password Dump web page and create files containing the master password in plaintext. The provided file name must be an absolute path to the target file, the target file can not already exist and all parent directories must already exist. ### Details When dumping the master password, GeoServer will use the provided file name with minimal validation as long as it is a java.io.File path. The only limitation is that the fix for a previous, unrelated vulnerability prevents relative path traversal here but absolute paths can be used to access arbitrary files. GeoServer does not enforce a maximum password length by default which allows an administrator to place malicious code into their password which could then be dumped into a JSP file. ### Impact #### Remote Code Execution (High severity) This vulnerability can lead to executing arbitrary code if GeoServer is deployed in an environment where an attacker can dynamically deploy and execute a JSP file. This is possible if the geoserver.war file is simply placed into the webap

GitHub Advisory Database

org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app

source listed
  • <= 2.26.3

### Summary A vulnerability exists that allows an authenticated administrator with access to GeoServer's security system to pass arbitrary file names to the Master Password Dump web page and create files containing the master password in plaintext. The provided file name must be an absolute path to the target file, the target file can not already exist and all parent directories must already exist. ### Details When dumping the master password, GeoServer will use the provided file name with minimal validation as long as it is a java.io.File path. The only limitation is that the fix for a previous, unrelated vulnerability prevents relative path traversal here but absolute paths can be used to access arbitrary files. GeoServer does not enforce a maximum password length by default which allows an administrator to place malicious code into their password which could then be dumped into a JSP file. ### Impact #### Remote Code Execution (High severity) This vulnerability can lead to executing arbitrary code if GeoServer is deployed in an environment where an attacker can dynamically deploy and execute a JSP file. This is possible if the geoserver.war file is simply placed into the webap

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-7qmg-grcp-qf25 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. CVE-2025-52465 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗