vulnerability / NVI-00016201 / Revision 1
Duplicate Advisory: SSO Instance-Role Provisioning Allows Privilege Escalation to Instance Owner
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
n8n
source listed< 1.123.64
## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-35q8-9mj6-wjmf. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description n8n versions before 1.123.64, 2.29.8, and 2.30.1 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in Enterprise SSO instance-role provisioning. The provisioning path maps an IdP-asserted role claim to an n8n global role but does not prevent assignment of the global:owner role (unlike the token-exchange identity path, which rejects it). An SSO-authenticated user whose instance-role claim resolves to global:owner is provisioned as instance owner, gaining full administrative control over workflows, credentials, users, and instance configuration. Exploitation requires that Enterprise SSO is configured, instance-role provisioning is enabled via N8N_SSO_SCOPES_PROVISION_INSTANCE_ROLE (disabled by default), and the attacker controls the instance-role claim value issued by the IdP.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mwq7-vcmc-cm4q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.