vulnerability / NVI-00016205 / Revision 1
Gitea: Git LFS object reuse allows non-Code access to authorize private source objects
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for gitea.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
gitea.dev
source listed< 1.26.3
## Summary A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object. The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object. ## Impact This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units. A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible. If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure. The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2m9v-5q2g-58vq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.