vulnerability / NVI-00016208 / Revision 1
Nodemailer’s addressparser is vulnerable to DoS caused by recursive calls
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer, org.webjars.npm:nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nodemailer
source listed>= 3.0.0, <= 7.0.10
### Summary A DoS can occur that immediately halts the system due to the use of an unsafe function. ### Details According to **RFC 5322**, nested group structures (a group inside another group) are not allowed. Therefore, in lib/addressparser/index.js, the email address parser performs flattening when nested groups appear, since such input is likely to be abnormal. (If the address is valid, it is added as-is.) In other words, the parser flattens all nested groups and inserts them into the final group list. However, the code implemented for this flattening process can be exploited by malicious input and triggers DoS RFC 5322 uses a colon (:) to define a group, and commas (,) are used to separate members within a group. At the following location in lib/addressparser/index.js: https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/addressparser/index.js#L90 there is code that performs this flattening. The issue occurs when the email address parser attempts to process the following kind of malicious address header: ```g0: g1: g2: g3: ... gN: victim@example.com;``` Because no recursion depth limit is enforced, the parser repeatedly invokes itself in the pattern `addressparser →
org.webjars.npm:nodemailer
source listed>= 3.0.0, <= 6.10.1
### Summary A DoS can occur that immediately halts the system due to the use of an unsafe function. ### Details According to **RFC 5322**, nested group structures (a group inside another group) are not allowed. Therefore, in lib/addressparser/index.js, the email address parser performs flattening when nested groups appear, since such input is likely to be abnormal. (If the address is valid, it is added as-is.) In other words, the parser flattens all nested groups and inserts them into the final group list. However, the code implemented for this flattening process can be exploited by malicious input and triggers DoS RFC 5322 uses a colon (:) to define a group, and commas (,) are used to separate members within a group. At the following location in lib/addressparser/index.js: https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/addressparser/index.js#L90 there is code that performs this flattening. The issue occurs when the email address parser attempts to process the following kind of malicious address header: ```g0: g1: g2: g3: ... gN: victim@example.com;``` Because no recursion depth limit is enforced, the parser repeatedly invokes itself in the pattern `addressparser →
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rcmh-qjqh-p98v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.