vulnerability / NVI-00016211 / Revision 1
gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for google.golang.org/grpc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
google.golang.org/grpc
source listed< 1.82.1
Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in: - Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets. - Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields. ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ #### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` & `RequestedServerName` matchers - Affected Component: xDS RBAC - Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops. - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions. - If these
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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