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vulnerability / NVI-00016218 / Revision 1

PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for praisonai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqqCVE-2026-57132

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

8.2 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

praisonai

source listed
  • < 4.6.61

### Summary Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations. ### Details ```python # src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32 _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled' async def verify_token(...) -> None: if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED: return # all authentication skipped unconditionally ``` The application's own error message advertises the bypass: > "Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication." This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option. ### Proof of Concept ```python import os os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled" # verify_token() now returns immediately for any request # POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed) ``` Common vulnerable deployment: ```yaml # docker-compose.yml environment: - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled # auth completely disabled ``` ### Impact Full unauthenticated acces

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

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04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

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  1. GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

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Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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