vulnerability / NVI-00016229 / Revision 1
Open WebUI: Forged chat-file link allows cross-user file read and deletion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for open-webui. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.3 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
open-webui
source listed<= 0.9.5
## Summary Open WebUI `v0.9.5` lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary `file_id` values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, `has_access_to_file()` treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file. ## Impact Security boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity. An authenticated attacker who knows or obtains a victim `file_id` can make Open WebUI authorize, through an attacker-owned shared chat: - reading the victim file via `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content`, and - deleting the victim file via `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`. ## Root Cause Client-controlled message file IDs are persisted without file authorization checks: ```python # backend/open_webui/main.py await Chats.insert_chat_files( chat_id, user_message.get('id'), [ file_item.get('id') for file_item in user_message_files if file_item.get('type') == 'file' ], user.id, ) ``` `insert_chat_files()` stores the provided IDs directly: ```python # backend/open_webui/models/chats.py Chat
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-vrhc-3fr6-pc3c ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.