vulnerability / NVI-00016235 / Revision 1
Armeria: External Control of File Name or Path in xDS SDS DataSource
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for com.linecorp.armeria:armeria-xds. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
com.linecorp.armeria:armeria-xds
source listed< 1.40.0
## External Control of File Name or Path in xDS SDS DataSource ### Summary `DataSourceStream` in the `:xds` module resolves control-plane-supplied `filename` and `environment_variable` fields from SDS Secret resources without any allow-list or base-directory confinement. A semi-trusted or compromised xDS control plane (or an attacker who can MITM SDS responses) can read arbitrary local files and environment variables on the xDS client host. **Affected component:** `xds/src/main/java/com/linecorp/armeria/xds/DataSourceStream.java` **Introduced in:** Armeria 1.38.0 (commit `b199560b10`, "Add support for SDS", #6597) **Affected versions:** 1.38.0, 1.39.0 ### Impact A semi-trusted or compromised xDS control plane (or an attacker who can inject/MITM SDS responses) can: - **Read arbitrary files** on the xDS client host — TLS private keys, `/etc/passwd`, mounted Kubernetes service-account tokens, cloud credential files, etc. - **Read arbitrary environment variables** — `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, CI tokens, database credentials, etc. The read bytes are consumed as TLS key/cert/CA material. Combined with CWE-295 (silent disabling of upstream TLS peer verification), the exfiltrated secr
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hgw6-8c77-v4gq ↗
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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