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vulnerability / NVI-00016275 / Revision 1

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgjCVE-2026-56750

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

code.gitea.io/gitea

source listed
  • < 1.27.0

The vulnerability is in the Remember-Me (gitea_incredible) token validation logic, specifically when handling a compromised token (hash mismatch). The vulnerable function is this one: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L33-L64 ### Affected Endpoint POST `/user/login` (and any endpoint triggering `autoSignIn` via the Remember-Me cookie). ### Description Gitea implements Remember-Me cookies using a split token design (ID:Hash), citing the Paragonie secure remember-me guide. When a token is used, its Hash is rotated, but the ID remains the same. If an attacker steals a user's Remember-Me token and uses it to authenticate, the attacker is issued a new rotated token (same ID, new Hash). When the legitimate user later attempts to use their original token, Gitea correctly detects a hash mismatch for the given ID. According to the referenced Paragonie specification, this indicates a compromised token, and ALL active remember-me sessions for that user MUST be invalidated. However, Gitea's `CheckAuthT

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

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  1. GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

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