vulnerability / NVI-00016280 / Revision 1
n8n: Improper Authorization Allows Authenticated Users to Assign Workflows to Folders in Other Projects
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
n8n
source listed< 2.28.0
## Impact An authenticated user with permission to create workflows in one project could bypass project/folder authorization boundaries during workflow creation. By supplying a crafted request payload, the user could associate a newly created workflow with a folder belonging to a different project they do not have access to. The workflow itself remains in the attacker's project and is not visible to the target project's members. The target project's folder ownership is not changed, and no data from the target project is exposed. The impact is limited to a logical integrity violation of the target project's folder structure at the database level. This issue affects instances with multi-project and folder support enabled. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.28.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict project membership and workflow creation permissions to fully trusted users only. This workaround does not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as a short-term mitigation measure.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-2xgm-wc4g-5jvg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.