vulnerability / NVI-00016284 / Revision 1
NocoDB: Refresh Token Cookie Set Without `secure` and `sameSite` Flags
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nocodb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nocodb
source listed<= 0.301.3
### Summary The refresh-token cookie was set with `httpOnly: true` but missing both the `secure` flag and the `sameSite` attribute. Over plain HTTP the cookie could be intercepted on the network; without `sameSite`, browsers attached it to cross-site POSTs, enabling CSRF against the token-refresh endpoint. ### Details In `packages/nocodb/src/services/users/helpers.ts`, `setTokenCookie` produced the cookie with only `httpOnly`, an `expires` date, and an optional `domain` from `NC_BASE_HOST_NAME` — no `secure`, no `sameSite`. The refresh endpoint `POST /api/v2/auth/token/refresh` (`auth.controller.ts`) read the cookie unconditionally and returned a new JWT, with no CSRF token. The fix sets `httpOnly: true`, `sameSite: 'lax'`, and conditional `secure: req.ncSiteUrl.startsWith('https')` so the flag is active under HTTPS while still functional on plain-HTTP localhost development. This is distinct from GHSA-x4vh-j75g-268g (refresh-token lifecycle on password reset) — different root cause, different attack vector. ### Impact - Cookie interception on plain HTTP networks (no `secure`). - Cross-site refresh: malicious cross-origin pages could trigger token refresh and, combined with a
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f74w-272x-mqcv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.