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vulnerability / NVI-00016296 / Revision 1

Crawl4AI: AST Sandbox Escape via gi_frame.f_back Chain - Pre-Auth RCE in Docker API

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for crawl4ai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7CVE-2026-53753

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

9.8 critical

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

crawl4ai

source listed
  • <= 0.8.6

### Summary The `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution. The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema. ### Attack Vector An attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that: 1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame` 2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back` 3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__` 4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands ### Impact Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets. ### Fix Details 1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value 2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_B

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

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