vulnerability / NVI-00016315 / Revision 1
TsDProxy: X-Forwarded-For header injection allows IP spoofing in proxied requests to backend services
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/almeidapaulopt/tsdproxy. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/almeidapaulopt/tsdproxy
source listed< 3.0.0-alpha.3
## Description The HTTP reverse proxy handler in tsdproxy does not strip the X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) header from incoming requests before calling r.SetXForwarded(). This allows an authenticated Tailscale user to inject arbitrary X-Forwarded-For values that are forwarded verbatim to backend services. ```go // internal/proxymanager/port.go -- Rewrite function Rewrite: func(r *httputil.ProxyRequest) { r.SetURL(pconfig.GetFirstTarget()) r.Out.Host = r.In.Host // Strips tsdproxy identity headers (correct) r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderID) r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderRemoteUser) r.Out.Header.Del(consts.HeaderXForwardedUser) // ... other identity headers deleted ... // X-Forwarded-For is NOT deleted before SetXForwarded! // X-Real-IP is NOT deleted at all! r.SetXForwarded() // APPENDS client IP to attacker-controlled XFF list }, ``` Per Go's httputil.ProxyRequest.SetXForwarded() documentation: > If the inbound request has an existing X-Forwarded-For header, SetXForwarded appends the inbound request's remote address to the list. Result when attacker sends X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1: - Backend receives: X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1, <rea
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.