By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00016336 / Revision 1

NLTK: Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz 'dot' binary

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nltk. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vmCVE-2026-78680

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.8 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

nltk

source listed
  • <= 3.10.2

Two NLTK sites executed the Graphviz `dot` program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path — and on Windows via the current working directory — rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named `dot` where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as `.` on `PATH`) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary code execution). Affected (<= 3.10.2): - `nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img` — called `find_binary("dot")` but discarded the returned validated path and then ran the bare name `["dot", ...]`, so the validation had no effect. - `nltk.translate.api.AlignedSent._repr_svg_` — ran the bare name with no validation at all (IPython SVG rendering). This is the same class already fixed for the senna, weka, boxer, malt, repp and hunpos wrappers. `nltk.internals.find_binary` refuses a CWD-relative match for a bare tool name and returns only a trusted absolute path; the fix runs that path in both sites. --- ## Attack demonstration Captured output, not illustrative. A `./dot` that writes a `PWNED` marker, planted in the CWD with `.` prepended to `PATH`. **The vulnerable behaviour (old

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗