vulnerability / NVI-00016378 / Revision 1
MCP Atlassian: JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER allow forbidden-project content exfiltration (one LIVE-proven on Atlassian Cloud)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mcp-atlassian. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mcp-atlassian
source listed< 0.22.0
### Summary `mcp-atlassian` is a popular community MCP server wrapper exposing Jira / Confluence to MCP clients. Operators commonly restrict the surface to a small allowlist of projects/spaces via the `JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER` and `CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER` environment variables, which the README documents as the principal mechanism for limiting attacker-controlled MCP clients (= prompt-injected LLM agents) to the operator's intended subset of the workspace. We identified **three distinct sub-bugs** that let attacker-controlled queries read content from **forbidden** projects/spaces (= projects NOT in the operator's filter) despite the filter being correctly set. The most severe is **empirically reproduced on production Atlassian Cloud** with real operator credentials and sentinel content in two real projects. | Sub-bug | Layer | Class | Live? | |---|---|---|---| | **A1** | Jira `jira_search` `jql` | substring-bypass | 🔴 **LIVE PROVEN 2026-05-18 on real Atlassian Cloud** | | **A2** | Confluence `confluence_search` `cql` | case-sensitive substring-bypass | code-level verified | | **B** | Jira agile `get_board_issues` / `get_agile_boards` | zero-filter (missing check) | code-level v
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w66g-j6c4-hcfc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.