vulnerability / NVI-00016391 / Revision 1
New API: Admin can reset passkeys for same-level or higher-privileged users
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
source listed>= 0.9.1.3, < 1.0.0-rc.7
## Summary The admin passkey reset endpoint lacked the role-level authorization check used by comparable privileged account-protection endpoints. A lower-privileged administrator could attempt passkey reset operations against same-level or higher-privileged users, including root-level accounts. ## Impact If the target account had a passkey configured, a lower-privileged administrator could remove that authentication factor and weaken the target account's protection boundary. The attacker still needed administrator privileges, so the issue is rated Medium. ## Affected versions The vulnerable admin passkey reset behavior was present from the passkey feature introduction in `v0.9.1.3` through versions before `v1.0.0-rc.7`. ## Patches This issue is fixed in `v1.0.0-rc.7`. The fix adds a `canManageTargetRole` check to `AdminResetPasskey` before passkey lookup or deletion, preventing lower-privileged administrators from operating on same-level or higher-privileged users. ## Workarounds If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict admin access to trusted operators only and block `DELETE /api/user/:id/reset_passkey` at the reverse proxy or gateway except for root operators.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.