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vulnerability / NVI-00016436 / Revision 1

n8n: AI Agents Project Viewer Privilege Escalation via run_node_tool

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n, n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9CVE-2026-65015

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

n8n

source listed
  • >= 2.30.0, < 2.30.1

## Impact In n8n's AI Agents feature, a user with the read-only Project Viewer role could escalate their privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled. The agent's node-execution tool was authorized only by the `agent:execute` scope and ran nodes using the project's credentials, without verifying that the requesting user was permitted to execute nodes or to access those credentials. As a result, a Project Viewer could execute arbitrary tool nodes on the server and use credential secrets they were not authorized to read, gaining execution capabilities their role is intended to deny. On instances where a command- or file-capable tool node (such as Execute Command or SSH) is enabled, this could be extended to arbitrary command execution on the n8n host. Users of the AI Agents feature who share team projects with lower-privileged members are affected. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.29.8 and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the AI Agents module by

GitHub Advisory Database

n8n

source listed
  • < 2.29.8

## Impact In n8n's AI Agents feature, a user with the read-only Project Viewer role could escalate their privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled. The agent's node-execution tool was authorized only by the `agent:execute` scope and ran nodes using the project's credentials, without verifying that the requesting user was permitted to execute nodes or to access those credentials. As a result, a Project Viewer could execute arbitrary tool nodes on the server and use credential secrets they were not authorized to read, gaining execution capabilities their role is intended to deny. On instances where a command- or file-capable tool node (such as Execute Command or SSH) is enabled, this could be extended to arbitrary command execution on the n8n host. Users of the AI Agents feature who share team projects with lower-privileged members are affected. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.29.8 and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the AI Agents module by

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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