vulnerability / NVI-00016458 / Revision 1
MCP Atlassian: HTTP upload tools accept arbitrary server-local file paths
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mcp-atlassian. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mcp-atlassian
source listed< 0.22.0
# sooperset/mcp-atlassian: HTTP upload tools can attach arbitrary server-local files Date: 2026-05-05 Target: `sooperset/mcp-atlassian` Commit: `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d` ## Summary `mcp-atlassian` supports HTTP/SSE deployment for persistent, remote, and multi-user use. In that mode, write-capable Jira and Confluence attachment flows accept caller-controlled server-local file paths and read those paths without an upload-source allowlist or base directory restriction. An authenticated caller, or a prompt-injected agent with tool-call capability, can cause the MCP server process to read a local file it can access and attach that file into a Jira issue or Confluence page using configured Atlassian credentials. This is distinct from the prior download-path advisory: that issue was an arbitrary file write sink. This path is upload-source local file disclosure. ## Impact Impact is local file disclosure through an authenticated Atlassian attachment write. In Docker/Kubernetes deployments that mount `.env` or token material into the service, exposed files may include API tokens, OAuth credentials, service configuration, or other local secrets readable by the MCP proc
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mrq8-fv7v-hhjg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.