vulnerability / NVI-00017473 / Revision 1
Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember can run shell on every server (cross-tenant RCE) via POST /api/v1/cron
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/nezhahq/nezha. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.9 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/nezhahq/nezha
source listed>= 1.4.0, < 1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d7526351cf97
## Summary `nezha`'s dashboard supports two user roles: `RoleAdmin` (Role==0) and `RoleMember` (Role==1). The cron routes `POST /api/v1/cron` and `PATCH /api/v1/cron/:id` are wired through `commonHandler` (any authenticated user) rather than `adminHandler`, and the per-server permission check on cron creation has a vacuous-true bypass. A `RoleMember` user can create a scheduled cron task with `Cover=CronCoverAll, Servers=[]` and an arbitrary `Command`. At every tick of the scheduler, the dashboard pushes that command to **every server in the global `ServerShared` map** — including servers that belong to other tenants (admin's servers, other members' servers). Each agent runs the command and returns the output, which is then sent to the attacker's own NotificationGroup → attacker-controlled webhook. Net effect: any `RoleMember` (including a self-bound OAuth2 user, if the dashboard has OAuth2 configured) gets pre-validated cross-tenant RCE on every nezha-monitored host in the deployment. ## Affected versions Commit `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a` and earlier on `master`. ## The auth gate ```go // cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-135 auth.GET("/cron", listH
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-99gv-2m7h-3hh9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.