vulnerability / NVI-00017481 / Revision 1
SurrealDB: HTTP /rpc `sessions` method leaks attached session UUIDs, enabling full session hijack by anonymous callers
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for surrealdb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
surrealdb
source listed< 3.1.0
The HTTP `/rpc` `sessions` method returned every attached session UUID without authentication, and the `/rpc` handler accepted an arbitrary `session` field with no ownership check. An anonymous caller could enumerate UUIDs and impersonate any authenticated session. "Attached" means sessions registered via `{"method":"attach"}` — the only writer to the HTTP session map. Ordinary stateless `/rpc` requests use ephemeral per-request sessions that are filtered from `sessions()` and destroyed at end-of-request, so they are not enumerable. ### Exposure - **Exposed:** clients that issue `attach`, notably the official Rust SDK's `Http`/`Https` engine (auto-attaches once per `Surreal` handle). - **Not exposed:** REST endpoints (`/sql`, `/key`, `/signin`, `/export`, etc.); WebSocket `/rpc` (per-connection scope, `attach` refused); embedded / MCP usage; ad-hoc `POST /rpc` callers that never `attach`. ### Impact For each **attached and authenticated** session, an unauthenticated attacker can read, write, and delete any data the session can reach, dump metadata, invalidate sessions, and escalate to that session's privilege level (up to root). An attached session that has not yet authenticat
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5qfp-32cf-69jh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.