vulnerability / NVI-00017487 / Revision 1
Serena: Unauthenticated Flask dashboard on fixed port enables DNS rebinding → memory poisoning → RCE
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for serena-agent. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.3 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
serena-agent
source listed< 1.5.2
### Summary Serena's built-in web dashboard exposes an unauthenticated Flask API on a fixed, predictable port (TCP 24282, hardcoded as `0x5EDA` in `constants.py`). The server has no authentication, no CSRF protection, and no Host header validation. A DNS rebinding attack allows a malicious webpage to reach this API from any browser and write arbitrary content to the agent's persistent memory store — which the agent reads and acts on autonomously. Combined with `execute_shell_command` (enabled by default in all contexts via `shell=True`), this creates a full remote code execution chain requiring only that the victim visit a malicious webpage while Serena is running. ### Details **Root cause 1 — Unauthenticated dashboard (`src/serena/dashboard.py`)** The Flask server starts automatically (`web_dashboard: true` by default) on a fixed, predictable port with no auth middleware: ```python # src/serena/constants.py DASHBOARD_API_BASE_PORT = 0x5EDA # = 24282, always the same ``` ```python # src/serena/dashboard.py — no auth, no CSRF, no Host header validation on any route @self._app.route("/save_memory", methods=["POST"]) def save_memory(): request_data = request.get_json()
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-37h2-6p4f-mp3q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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