vulnerability / NVI-00017492 / Revision 2
Mise vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mise. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.6 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.184%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08056. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mise
source listed< 2026.6.4
### Summary mise's trust feature gates config files (`mise.toml`, `.tool-versions`) through `trust_check`, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (`mise-tasks/`, `.mise/tasks/`, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has `exec()` registered. A `{{ exec(command='…') }}` in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: `mise tasks`, `mise task ls`, `mise run`, `mise tasks --usage` (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to `cd` into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task ## Details Trust is enforced only inside config-file parsing: - `src/config/config_file/mise_toml.rs:276` — `MiseToml::from_str` → `trust_check(path)?` - `src/config/config_file/tool_versions.rs:62` — `.tool-versions` parser → `trust_check(&path)?` - `src/config/env_directive/mod.rs:681` — env templates → `trust_check(path)?` (only when the value contains template syntax) Task-include files are loa
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-55441 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.