vulnerability / NVI-00017561 / Revision 1
Fission Environment CRD PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape and Cluster Takeover
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/fission/fission. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.9 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/fission/fission
source listed<= 1.23.0
### Summary A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the `Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` passthrough lacked validation, and `MergePodSpec` propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods. ### Details Three independent flaws compounded: 1. **Validate gap.** `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate` checked only container naming conventions, never `hostPID`/`hostIPC`/`hostNetwork`/`hostPath`/`privileged`. 2. **UPDATE bypass.** The `pkg/webhook/environment.go` kubebuilder marker registered `verbs=create` only. A tenant could `kubectl apply` a clean Environment and then `kubectl patch` in the dangerous fields — the webhook was never called. 3. **Merge propagation.** `pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec` unconditionally forwarded `HostPID`, `HostIPC`, `HostNetwork`, `Volumes` (including hostPath), `SecurityContext`, and `ServiceAccountName` into the Deployments generated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr. A `kubectl apply` plus a follow-up `kubectl patch` caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allo
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
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