vulnerability / NVI-00017589 / Revision 1
sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @sigstore/verify. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@sigstore/verify
source listed= 3.1.0
sigstore-js derives a transparency-log timestamp from `tlogEntries[].integratedTime` and uses it to validate certificate validity windows and satisfy `timestampThreshold`. For bundle v0.2, a tlog entry can be inclusionProof-only (no signed inclusionPromise/set), and the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind `integratedTime`. As a result, an attacker who can supply an untrusted bundle can influence time-based verification decisions by choosing `integratedTime`. ## impact If a consumer accepts attacker-provided bundle v0.2 inputs and relies on tlog-derived timestamps for certificate validity checks, verification can be influenced by an unauthenticated timestamp value. This is a trust gap: `integratedTime` is treated as a trusted observer timestamp under inclusionProof-only mode even though only the signed inclusionPromise/set path binds it. ## affected code - `packages/verify/src/bundle/index.ts` (adds a transparency-log timestamp whenever `integratedTime != 0`) - `packages/verify/src/timestamp/index.ts` (converts `integratedTime` to a `Date`) - `packages/verify/src/verifier.ts` (verifies timestamps before verifying tlog inclusion) - `packages/verify/src/tlog/index.t
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.