vulnerability / NVI-00017607 / Revision 1
SurrealDB: HTTP RPC Session Race Condition Allows Privilege Escalation
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for surrealdb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
surrealdb
source listed< 3.1.0
The HTTP `/rpc` endpoint has a time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition on internal session state. When authenticated and unauthenticated requests are processed concurrently, the unauthenticated request can inherit the authenticated user's session and privileges. The `/rpc` endpoint is the primary interface used by all official SurrealDB SDKs. The HTTP `/rpc` handler does not bind each incoming request to an isolated session context. Instead, concurrent requests share mutable authentication state. When an authenticated request sets the session context and an unauthenticated request races in before it is cleared, the unauthenticated request executes with the authenticated user's privileges. The impact depends on the privilege level of the session that is hijacked. If a root or namespace-level user session is inherited, the attacker can read and modify any data, delete records, and create persistent namespace-level users. If a scoped record user session is inherited, the attacker is limited to that user's permissions. The attack requires no credentials, tokens, or session knowledge — only the ability to send concurrent HTTP requests to the `/rpc` endpoint while legitimate
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-4vgr-h27g-cf9p ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.