vulnerability / NVI-00017609 / Revision 1
NeuVector has an insecure password storage and is vulnerable to rainbow attack
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/neuvector/neuvector. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.3 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/neuvector/neuvector
source listed< 0.0.0-20250825191744-da1a462074c3
### Impact NeuVector stores user passwords and API keys using a simple, unsalted hash. This method is vulnerable to rainbow table attack (offline attack where hashes of known passwords are precomputed). NeuVector generates a cryptographically secure, random 16-character salt and uses it with the PBKDF2 algorithm to create the hash value for the following actions: - Creating a user - Updating a user’s password - Creating an API key **Note:** After upgrading to NeuVector 5.4.6, users must log in again so that NeuVector can regenerate the password hash. For API keys, you must send at least one request per API key to regenerate its hash value. ### Patches This issue is fixed in NeuVector version **5.4.6** and later. ### Workarounds There is no workaround. Upgrade to a patched version of NeuVector as soon as possible. ### References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries. - Open an issue in the NeuVector repository. - Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.c
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-8ff6-pc43-jwv3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.