vulnerability / NVI-00017656 / Revision 1
Decidim: Admin user search allows SQL injection through similarity-based sorting
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for decidim-admin, decidim-admin, decidim-admin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
decidim-admin
source listed< 0.30.9
The admin organization user search uses the untrusted term value inside raw SQL ORDER BY expressions. Because the value is interpolated before Rails sanitization is applied, a crafted search string is executed by PostgreSQL as part of the sort expression. ### Technical description The vulnerable endpoint is exposed as GET `/admin/organization/users` in `decidim-admin/config/routes.rb`: ```ruby resource :organization, only: [:edit, :update], controller: "organization" do member do get :users end end ``` That route reaches `Decidim::Admin::OrganizationController#users`, which forwards the current organization's available users into `search`: ```ruby def users search(current_organization.users.available) end ``` Inside `search`, the attacker-controlled source is `params[:term]`: ```ruby if (term = params[:term].to_s).present? ``` The query has two branches. In both branches, the `WHERE` predicates use bind parameters and are not the injection sink. The vulnerability is in the subsequent `.order(Arel.sql(...))` calls, where the untrusted value is interpolated directly into SQL string literals. Nickname branch: ```ruby nickname = term.delete("@") relation.where("nic
decidim-admin
source listed>= 0.31.0.rc1, < 0.31.5
The admin organization user search uses the untrusted term value inside raw SQL ORDER BY expressions. Because the value is interpolated before Rails sanitization is applied, a crafted search string is executed by PostgreSQL as part of the sort expression. ### Technical description The vulnerable endpoint is exposed as GET `/admin/organization/users` in `decidim-admin/config/routes.rb`: ```ruby resource :organization, only: [:edit, :update], controller: "organization" do member do get :users end end ``` That route reaches `Decidim::Admin::OrganizationController#users`, which forwards the current organization's available users into `search`: ```ruby def users search(current_organization.users.available) end ``` Inside `search`, the attacker-controlled source is `params[:term]`: ```ruby if (term = params[:term].to_s).present? ``` The query has two branches. In both branches, the `WHERE` predicates use bind parameters and are not the injection sink. The vulnerability is in the subsequent `.order(Arel.sql(...))` calls, where the untrusted value is interpolated directly into SQL string literals. Nickname branch: ```ruby nickname = term.delete("@") relation.where("nic
decidim-admin
source listed>= 0.32.0.rc1, < 0.32.0
The admin organization user search uses the untrusted term value inside raw SQL ORDER BY expressions. Because the value is interpolated before Rails sanitization is applied, a crafted search string is executed by PostgreSQL as part of the sort expression. ### Technical description The vulnerable endpoint is exposed as GET `/admin/organization/users` in `decidim-admin/config/routes.rb`: ```ruby resource :organization, only: [:edit, :update], controller: "organization" do member do get :users end end ``` That route reaches `Decidim::Admin::OrganizationController#users`, which forwards the current organization's available users into `search`: ```ruby def users search(current_organization.users.available) end ``` Inside `search`, the attacker-controlled source is `params[:term]`: ```ruby if (term = params[:term].to_s).present? ``` The query has two branches. In both branches, the `WHERE` predicates use bind parameters and are not the injection sink. The vulnerability is in the subsequent `.order(Arel.sql(...))` calls, where the untrusted value is interpolated directly into SQL string literals. Nickname branch: ```ruby nickname = term.delete("@") relation.where("nic
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jvqq-cvh4-xm37 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.