vulnerability / NVI-00017667 / Revision 1
Open Babel has out-of-bounds write in MSI translationVectors[]
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for openbabel. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
openbabel
source listed< 3.2.0
### Summary A memory-safety vulnerability in Open Babel's MSI parser allowed an out-of-bounds write into the `translationVectors[]` array when reading a crafted input file. ### Details The MSI reader stored cell translation vectors into a fixed-size `translationVectors[]` array. A malformed input could push more vectors than the array had slots, causing a write past the end of the array. One of five `translationVectors[]` OOB writes in the TALOS 2022 batch. ### Impact Open Babel is a C++ library and CLI used to read and write chemistry file formats; it is shipped by Linux distributions and embedded in services that may parse untrusted input. Triggering this vulnerability requires the victim to open a malicious MSI file with the `obabel` tool, the `OBConversion` API, or any of the language bindings (Python, Ruby, Java, R, Perl, C#, PHP). ### Affected versions All releases up to and including 3.1.1. ### Patched version 3.2.0 (released 2026-05-26). ### Patch Fix commit: https://github.com/openbabel/openbabel/commit/40e85213 A minimized reproducer for this CVE is checked in under `test/files/fuzz_regress/` and is exercised on every CI build under ASAN+UBSAN by the `fuzzregr
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-f8h2-c479-vqxf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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