vulnerability / NVI-00017728 / Revision 1
electerm has Command Injection in File System Operations (rmrf, mv, cp)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electerm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
electerm
source listed<= 3.11.0
### Impact A command injection vulnerability exists in electerm's file system operations (`rmrf`, `mv`, `cp`) in `src/app/lib/fs.js`. These functions construct shell commands by interpolating file paths directly into command strings without escaping shell metacharacters. **Vulnerable functions:** - `rmrf()` - Uses `rm -rf "${path}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) - `mv()` - Uses `mv '${from}' '${to}'` (single quotes, vulnerable to `'` injection) - `cp()` - Uses `cp -r "${from}" "${to}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) **Attack scenario:** 1. Attacker controls a malicious SSH/SFTP server 2. Server lists files with shell metacharacters in names (e.g., `file"$(touch /tmp/pwned)"`) 3. Victim connects to the server and performs file operations (remote-to-local transfer, rename on conflict, etc.) 4. The malicious filename is passed to `rmrf()`, `mv()`, or `cp()` without sanitization 5. Shell metacharacters break out of the quoted argument and execute arbitrary commands **Impact includes:** - Arbitrary command execution as the electerm desktop user - Data exfiltration, malware installation, or system compromise - Both POSIX (bash) and Windows (PowerShell) pl
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-v5ff-xmfp-p245 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.