vulnerability / NVI-00017771 / Revision 1
Coder's AI Bridge Proxy skips TLS certificate verification in default configuration
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2, github.com/coder/coder/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/coder/coder/v2
source listed>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2
### Summary The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middle) position between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server. Deployments where they are co-located over loopback are effectively unaffected. ### Impact An attacker positioned between the proxy and the Coder server, via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning or control of proxy environment variables, could intercept injected Coder session tokens, user-supplied provider API keys (BYOK) and full request and response bodies including prompts and completions. The default transport also honored `HTTP_PROXY` and `HTTPS_PROXY`, allowing environment-based traffic redirection. ### Patches The fix applies the secure transport (TLS 1.2 or higher using system root CAs) unconditionally. The AI Bridge Proxy was introduced in v2.30.0. Earlier release lines including the v2.29 ESR line are not affected. The fix
github.com/coder/coder/v2
source listed>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8
### Summary The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middle) position between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server. Deployments where they are co-located over loopback are effectively unaffected. ### Impact An attacker positioned between the proxy and the Coder server, via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning or control of proxy environment variables, could intercept injected Coder session tokens, user-supplied provider API keys (BYOK) and full request and response bodies including prompts and completions. The default transport also honored `HTTP_PROXY` and `HTTPS_PROXY`, allowing environment-based traffic redirection. ### Patches The fix applies the secure transport (TLS 1.2 or higher using system root CAs) unconditionally. The AI Bridge Proxy was introduced in v2.30.0. Earlier release lines including the v2.29 ESR line are not affected. The fix
github.com/coder/coder/v2
source listed>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7
### Summary The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middle) position between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server. Deployments where they are co-located over loopback are effectively unaffected. ### Impact An attacker positioned between the proxy and the Coder server, via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning or control of proxy environment variables, could intercept injected Coder session tokens, user-supplied provider API keys (BYOK) and full request and response bodies including prompts and completions. The default transport also honored `HTTP_PROXY` and `HTTPS_PROXY`, allowing environment-based traffic redirection. ### Patches The fix applies the secure transport (TLS 1.2 or higher using system root CAs) unconditionally. The AI Bridge Proxy was introduced in v2.30.0. Earlier release lines including the v2.29 ESR line are not affected. The fix
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-84rm-42xw-mx52 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.