vulnerability / NVI-00017824 / Revision 1
Fission builder pods auto-mount the fission-builder ServiceAccount token in the user-supplied builder container
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/fission/fission. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.9 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/fission/fission
source listed<= 1.23.0
### Summary Fission builder pods were created with `ServiceAccountName: fission-builder` and no `AutomountServiceAccountToken: false`, so the kubelet auto-mounted the service-account token into every container in the pod — including the user-supplied builder image. ### Details The user controls the builder container image, command, and podspec through `Environment.spec.builder.image` / `.container` / `.podspec`. With the SA token auto-mounted at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` inside that container, any code running there inherited the `fission-builder` identity. The `fission-builder` SA holds namespace-wide `get` on `secrets` and `configmaps` (`pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go`), so the user-controlled builder container could read every Secret in the builder namespace by name. This is the buildermgr sibling of GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q (CVE-2026-46617), whose fix suppressed the SA-token automount on function runtime pods but did not cover the structurally identical primitive in `pkg/buildermgr/envwatcher.go`. ### Impact A subject with `create`/`update` on `Environment` CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could read every Secret and ConfigMap in the bui
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-8wcj-mfrc-jx5q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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