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vulnerability / NVI-00017860 / Revision 1

Http4s Ember HTTP/2: unbounded continuation frame accumulation

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-cp4q-fqw9-4hf6CVE-2026-69218

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

7.5 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12

source listed
  • <= 0.23.34

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 resp

GitHub Advisory Database

org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13

source listed
  • <= 0.23.34

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 resp

GitHub Advisory Database

org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3

source listed
  • <= 0.23.34

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 resp

GitHub Advisory Database

org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13

source listed
  • >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 resp

GitHub Advisory Database

org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3

source listed
  • >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 resp

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-cp4q-fqw9-4hf6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗