vulnerability / NVI-00018272 / Revision 1
Apostrophe has authenticated SSRF in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area/validate-widget
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for apostrophe. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.6 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
apostrophe
source listed<= 4.29.0
### Summary ApostropheCMS contains an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration. ### Details The vulnerable flow is in the rich-text widget sanitizer: - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/rich-text-widget/index.js` - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/area/index.js` - `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js` Relevant behavior: 1. The backend accepts a widget payload containing `import.html`. 2. It parses `` values from that HTML. 3. For each image, it resolves the URL with: - `new URL(src, input.import.baseUrl || self.apos.baseUrl)` 4. It then performs a server-side `fetch(url)`. 5. The fetched body is written to a temp file and imported through Apostrophe image/attachment logic. This is reachable during widget validation through: - `POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.