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vulnerability / NVI-00018278 / Revision 1

NodeVM observability builtins leak host process and HTTP request data

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vm2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28fCVE-2026-47141

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

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02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

vm2

source listed
  • <= 3.11.3

## Summary `NodeVM` exposes some process-wide observability builtins when they are allowed through `require.builtin`. The following builtins are not blocked by the dangerous builtin denylist: ```text diagnostics_channel async_hooks perf_hooks ``` These modules are process-wide, not sandbox-local. Sandboxed code can use them to observe host application data across the vm2 boundary. **Note**: It is a host data exposure issue. The impact depends on whether the host application allows these builtins and uses HTTP, async request context, diagnostics channels, or performance marks in the same process. ## Details Non-denied builtins are exposed to the sandbox through `lib/builtin.js`: ```js builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key))); ``` `diagnostics_channel`, `async_hooks`, and `perf_hooks` are not denied. These modules expose host process state rather than sandbox-local state. Confirmed examples: 1. `diagnostics_channel` lets sandboxed code subscribe to Node.js HTTP diagnostic channels such as `http.server.request.start`. The sandbox receives host HTTP request objects and can read headers such as `Authorization` or session tokens. 2. `async_hoo

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

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04 / Limits

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05 / Provenance

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  1. GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

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Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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