vulnerability / NVI-00018286 / Revision 1
Authenticated Remote Code Execution via loadReader functionName code injection in DbGate
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for dbgate-api. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
dbgate-api
source listed<= 7.1.8
### Summary DbGate is vulnerable to authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). Any user with valid DbGate credentials can execute arbitrary OS commands as root by exploiting an unsanitized `functionName` parameter in the `/runners/load-reader` endpoint. The `require = null` mitigation is trivially bypassed via dynamic `import()`. ### Details **Code injection via `functionName` in loadReader** The `/runners/load-reader` endpoint interpolates the `functionName` parameter directly into a dynamically generated JavaScript script template without any sanitization: ```javascript // packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js (loadReader / loaderScriptTemplate) const reader = await dbgateApi.${functionName}({...}); ``` By injecting a newline character into `functionName`, an attacker breaks out of the template expression and injects arbitrary JavaScript code. The injected code uses `await import('child_process')` to bypass the `require = null` mitigation (since `import()` is a language keyword, not a function that can be nullified), achieving arbitrary command execution as the process user (root in Docker). The June 2025 security fix ([commit cf3f95c](https://github.com/dbgate/d
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wm5r-5qp3-5vxf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.