vulnerability / NVI-00018305 / Revision 1
free5GC's PCF npcf-policyauthorization POST /app-sessions panics on suppFeat=1 with missing AfRoutReq via nil pointer dereference
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/free5gc/pcf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/free5gc/pcf
source listed< 1.4.3
### Summary free5GC's PCF `POST /npcf-policyauthorization/v1/app-sessions` handler panics on a single authenticated request whose `ascReqData.suppFeat == "1"` (enabling traffic-routing feature negotiation) and whose `medComponents` entries supply an `afAppId` but NO `AfRoutReq`. The create path then calls `provisioningOfTrafficRoutingInfo(smPolicy, appID, routeReq, ...)` with `routeReq == nil` and dereferences `routeReq.RouteToLocs` (and other fields) without a nil check, causing `runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference`. Gin recovery converts the panic into `HTTP 500`. The trigger is a single valid authenticated request -- changing only `suppFeat` from `"0"` to `"1"` flips the same shape of POST from a normal `201 Created` into a panic-driven `500`. This endpoint requires a valid `npcf-policyauthorization` OAuth2 access token (PR:L). The PCF process is not killed (Gin recovers); the realized impact is per-request panic-DoS on the app-session create path. ### Details Validated against the PCF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - PCF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.9:8000` - Validation date: 2026-03-12 Vulnerable handl
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wwqh-7jm5-gj7w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.