vulnerability / NVI-00018342 / Revision 1
FUXA has SQL Injection in its TDengine DAQ connector via backslash bypass of escapeTdString
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fuxa-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.3 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
fuxa-server
source listed<= 1.1.14-1243
## Summary The TDengine DAQ storage connector's `escapeTdString` at `server/runtime/storage/tdengine/index.js:10` doubles single quotes but does not escape backslashes. TDengine's SQL parser treats `\'` as a literal single quote inside a string, so a tag id of the form `x\' OR 1=1--` escapes the first single quote, lets the doubled quote close the string, and appends an injected clause that runs on the TDengine server. An attacker (Alice) sends the crafted `sids` value through `GET /api/daq` or the Socket.IO `DAQ_QUERY` event and reads every row in `fuxa.meters`, which holds the historical tag values of every PLC the FUXA instance records. ## Details The TDengine DAQ storage connector did not correctly sanitize user-controlled values before including them in SQL queries. A specially crafted tag identifier could bypass the intended escaping logic and alter the query executed against the TDengine database. This could allow unauthorized access to historical DAQ data stored in TDengine, including recorded tag values and related metadata. The issue has been fixed in version 1.3.2 by improving input escaping in the TDengine connector. ## Impact An attacker with network access to
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-h9fj-c2qr-76g2 ↗
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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